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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
ILLINOIS

v.

LANCE GATES

ET

ux.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF ILLINOIS

No. 81--430.

Decided January

, 1982

dissenting.
I dissent for the reason that the Illinois Supreme Court
clearly misapplies well settled law that a detailed tip from an
a11onymot1s informant. which is subsequently corroborated
by the police. presents sufficient probable cause to support a
sea1rch warrant. Draperr v. United States, 358 U. S. 307
(1959).
The Bloomingdale, Illinois police department received an
anonymous letter giving respondents' address and stating
that they made their living selling drugs. The letter contained a detailed description of respondent method of operation: that respondent Susan Gates would drive her car to
Florida where it would be loaded with drugs; that respondent
Lance Gates would fly to Florida and drive the car back; that
respondent Susan Gates would then return by airplane. The
letter stated that a drug transaction would occur on May 3d.
Finally, the letter stated that respondents had over $100,000
in drugs in their basement.
The police confirmed, through a confidential informant,
that the address in the letter was correct. Respondent
Lance Gates made a reservation and flew to Florida on May
5th. He went to a motel room registered to his wife and
later left in an automobile with tags registered in his QDPH
although for another automobile. After observing this detailed corroboration of the anonvmous OHWWHU the Bloomingdale police obtained a warrant to searcl1 respondents home
and the FDUthat they were tlsing in Florida. Whe11 respondents DUULYHG back in Illi110is by car on May 7 h the police
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VHDUFKHGthe trunk of the car and found 350 pounds of mari-

Juana. A search of the house revealed marijuana weapons
and drug paraphernalia.
'
'
. The DFWLYLWLHV of. UHVSRQGHQWV corresponded almost precisely with the predictive statements contained in the letter
making this an a fortiori case under Draper v. United States:
358 U. S. 307 (1959). Despite this strong corroboration, the
Illinois courts suppressed the evidence obtained from the
search warrants. Applying the two-pronged test of Aguilar
v. T exas, 378 U. S. 108 (1964), the Illinois Supreme Court
concluded that the anonymous letter failed either to state t he
basis of the informant's knowledge or to provide sufficient information to evaluate the truthfulness of the informant. *
The Illinois court found the substantial corroboration insufficient to cure these defects because it failed to establish that
the informant based the tip on personal knowledge. The Illinois Court-misapplying Draper-also concluded that great
detail in the anonymous tip is not, alone, sufficient to establish the veracity of the informant. Finally, the Court observed that the corroborating evidence was of "clearly innocent'' activity.
In Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307 (1959), this
Court found probable cause when a previously-reliable informant supplied information describing the defendant's cloth-

ing and physical appearance and stating that the defendant
would be at a train at a certain time as part of a drug transaction. The police arrested and searched defendant after the
information from the informant was corroborated by the personal observation of the police. The activity involved in
Draper, like the activity in this case, was not FULPLQDOwhen
viewed in isolation. When Draper's activity was viewed in
*The Illinois Supreme Court cited provisions from both the federal and
stater constitutions. It is readily apparent from the decision, however,
that the Illinois Supreme Court was relying on f ederal constitutional
State Tax Comm'n v. Va·n Cott, 306 U. S.
grounds to justify its holding.
511, 514 (1939) (state and federal grounds so interwoven that it is impossible to conclude that the judgment rests on an independent interpretation of
state law).
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light of the informant's information, however, it t(Jok on an
"aura of VXVSLFLRQsufficient to justify a finding of probable
cause. 6SLQHOOLv. United States, 393 U. S. 410, 418  
In Spinelli, supra, an affidavit in support of a search ZDrrant contained information that a "confidential reliable informant'' had stated that a bookkeeping operation was being
maintained at a certain address. The police also observed
activities consistent with a bookkeeping orJeration, but 'Nhich
were in themselves innocent. In holding that the informant's information was not sufficient to establish probable
cause, the Court noted that "it is especially important that
the tip describe the accused's criminal activity in sufficient
detail that the magistrate may know that he is relying on
something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in
the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation."
393 U. S., at 416 (emphasis
added). In this case, as in Draper, the judicial officer issuing

the warrant could resonably infer from the detailed information, \vhich was provided by the informant and subsequently
corroborated by the police, that the informant was indeed
trust\vorthy and had obtained his information in a "reliable
way." Spinelli, 393 U.S., at 417. Verification of reliability
of both the information and the informant was the purpose of

the two-pronged Aguilar rule. Draper and Spinelli establish that this verification may come from the police corroboration of the detailed tip of an anonymou informant.
In light of the establi hed guideline of Draper and
Spinelli, I would grant the petition for certiorari and ummarily reverse the holding of the Illinoi upreme Court.

